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[Crim. No. 5664. In Bank. Apr. 27, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALFRED BERGER, 
Appellant. 
[1] Mandamus-Findings and Judgment.-Although findings of 
fact may not be necessary to support denial of petition for 
writ of mandamus, entry of judgment is necessary to make 
it a final decision effectual for any purpose. 
[2] Id.-Judgment-Conclusiveness.-Judgment in first mandamus 
proceeding directing municipal court to return to petitioner 
papers unlawfully seized under void warrant is not affected 
by second mandamus proceeding by petitioner in superior court 
for order directing delivery to him of photostats taken of such 
seized papers where second mandamus proceeding has not 
been terminated by entry of judgment. 
[3] Criminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Photostats made from documents unlawfully seized 
under void warrant, being as tainted by such illegal search 
and seizure as original papers themselves, are not admissible 
in evidenee. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Evidenee Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-
Motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence may be made 
when such evidence is offered at trial, and no preliminary 
motion need be made in advance of trial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying 
motions for new trial and in I\rrest of judgment. Melvyn I. 
Cronin, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit grand and petty theft 
arid conspiracy to solicit for charitable funds without a permit. 
Judgment of conviction reversed. 
Morris M. Grupp for Appellant. 
Charles R. Garry, Norman Leonard, George Olshausen and 
Leo R. Friedman as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
[3] Admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and 
seizure, notes, 24 A.L.R. 1408; 32 A.L.R. 408; 41 A.L.R. 1145; 
52 A.L.R. 477; 88 A.L.R. 348; 150 A.L.R. 566. See also Ca1.Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 177; Am.Juf., Evidence, § 394 et seq. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, §§ 105, 106; [2] Man-
Gam11&, § 106; [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 410. 
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Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and Arlo 
E. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, Thomas C. Lynch, Dis-
trict Attorney (City and County of San Francisco), William 
B. Acton and Irving F. Reichert, Jr., Assistant District 
Attorneys, for Respondent. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), William 
H. Parker, Chief of Police, Bourke Jones, James A. Doherty 
and Alan G. Campbell, Assistant City Attorneys, Ralph Eu-
bank, Deputy City Attorney, J. F. Coakley, District Attorney 
(Alameda), R. Robert Hunter, Chief Assistant District Attor-
ney, Maury Engel, Bernard M. King and John C. Baldwin, 
Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to 
commit grand and petty theft and conspiracy to solicit for 
charitable purposes without a permit. (Pen. Code, § 182; 
San Francisco Police Code, § 590.) He appeals from the 
judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him 
guilty on both counts and from the order denying his mo-
tions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. 
Defendant employed several solicitors to obtain money for 
a publicity campaign for blood donations for wounded mem-
bers of the armed services. Introducing themselves as repre-
sentatives of patriotic and veterans organizations the solicitors 
telephoned thirty to fifty persons a day and asked for money 
to print newspaper advertisements, open a blood collection 
center, sponsor radio and television shows, buy blood, and 
provide cab fare for blood donors. In response to these calls, 
contributions totalling over $65,000 were made to defendant. 
He kept for his own use most of the money received. 
On March 12, 1952, members of the San Francisco police 
department and the district attorney's office entered de-
fendant's place of business, identified themselves and showed 
the office manager a search warrant. She asked them to wait 
for defendant, but the investigator from the district attorney's 
office replied, ' , Well, while we are waiting here there is no 
use wasting the time, we will just start looking into things 
and getting them ready to take what we want." For five 
hours the investigator, the police and an assistant district 
attorney ransacl.ed dC{'l'PJalit's files, desks, and wastehaskets. 
The investigator testified: ""We were looking around for evi-
-) 
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dence of the commission of the alleged crime . anything 
that showed the commission of the crime charged." They 
read letters, cards, and records, and, according to the in-
vestigator, seized "thousands; tens of thousands" of cards, 
letters, files, and other documents "that seemed relevant to 
the commission of the crime." Over defendant's protests, 
they loaded the seized papers on a van and took them to the 
district attorney's office. 
Upon the return of the warrant to the municipal court that 
issued it (see Pen. Code, § 1537), the court entered an order 
that the district attorney could retain the seized property I 
as evidence. Defendant contended that the warrant was void 
and made a motion to quash it. The motion was denied, and 
defendant then petitioned the superior court for a writ of 
mandamus directing the municipal court to return the seized 
property. In hearings on the motion the district attorney 
and defendant's counsel thoroughly argued the question of 
the validity of the warrant and the legality of the search and 
seizure pursuant to it. The warrant placed no restrictions 
on the area to be searched or the things to be seized and was 
strikingly similar to the general warrant authorizing un-
limited searches and seizures that was condemned when the 
right of privacy first received legal protection. (See H~tckle 
v. Money, 2 Wills K.B. 206, 207, 95 Eng.Rep. 768, 769 (1763) ; 
Entick v. Oarrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765); 
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, pp. 43-50.) The court 
held that the warrant was void and that the search and seizure 
pursuant to it were illegal and entered a judgment quashing 
the warrant and ordering defendant's property returned to 
him. No appeal was taken and the judgment became final. 
The district attorney returned the seized papers to defendant, 
but during the proceedings, and unknown to either the court 
or defendant, he had been making photostats of them. As 
soon as defendant learned of the photostats, he petitioned the 
superior court for a writ of mandamus directing their de-
livery to him. Although the record does not disclose the 
result of this proceeding, counsel agreed at oral argument 
that the court announced from the bench that it would deny 
the writ and asked that findings of fact and a formal judgment 
be prepared. Neither defendant nor the prosecution, how-
ever, prepared findings or a judgment, and no judgment was 
entered. At defendant's trial, the district attorney offered 
the photostats in evidence to show the nature and extent 
) 
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of defendant's operations. Defendant's objections to their 
admission on the ground that they had been obtained by a 
flagrant abuse of the judicial process and in violation of his 
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures 
were overruled. 
[1] Although findings of fact may not be necessary to 
support a denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus (see 
Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 328 
[74 P.2d 761] ; Brownell v. Supel"ior Oourt, 157 Cal. 703, 709 
[109 P. 91] ; Matter of Danford, 157 Cal. 425, 430 [108 P. 
322] ; Adoption of Pitcher, 103 Cal.App.2d 859, 864 [230 P.2d 
449] ), the entry of a judgment is necessary to make it a 
final decision effectual for any purpose. (BerTi v. Superior 
Oourt,43 Ca1.2d 856, 860 [279 P.2d 8] ; Phillips v. Phillips, 41 
Ca1.2d 869, 874 [264 P.2d 9261 ; Southern Pac. 00. v. Willett, 
216 Cal. 387, 390 [14 P.2d 526] ; Brownell v. Superior Court, 
157 Cal. 703, 708 [109 P. 91] ; Orim v. Kessing, 89 Cal. 478, 
489 [26 P. 1074, 23 Am.St.Rep. 491]; see State Board of 
Equalization v. Superior Oonrt, 20 Ca1.2d 467, 475 [127 P.2d 
4].) [2] Thus, the second mandamus proceeding, not hav-
ing been terminated by entry of a judgment, has no effect 
',on the judgment in the first mandamus proceeding, and that 
judgment therefore stands as a binding determination that 
the warrant was void, that the search was illegal, and that 
defendant's papers were unlawfully seized. (See Dillard v. 
McKnight, 34 Ca1.2d 209, 214 [209 P.2d 387, 11 A.L.R.2d 
835]; Krier v. Krier, 28 Ca1.2d 841, 843 [172 P.2d 681]; 
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Ca1.2d 807, 813 [122 P.2d 
892] ; Steele v. United States, No.2, 267 U.S. 505, 507 [45 
8.Ct. 417, 69 L.Ed. 761] ; State ex rel. Oampo v. Osborn, 126 
Conn. 214, 218 [10 A.2d 687] ; State ex rel. Warren v. Oity of 
Miami, 153 Fla. 644, 649 [15 So.2d 449] ; People ex rel. Bar-
clay v. West Ohieago Park Comrs., 308 Ill.App. 622, 629 
[32 N.E.2d 323].) 
[3] Since the photostats are as much a product of the 
illegal search and seizure and are as tainted by it as the 
original papers themselves (Silverthorne Lbr. 00. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 [40 8.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 
1426]), the deception practiced by the prosecution in this 
case cannot circumvent the rule adopted in People v. Oahan, 
ante, p. 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
[4] The attorney genera1 contends, however, that the 
objection made by defendant at the time the photostats were 
oJIered in evidence came too late. He arguea that if illesaII7 
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seized evidence is to be excluded, the defendant should be 
required to present his objections in advance of trial by a 
motion to suppress. A preliminary motion of this kind was 
required by the United States Supreme Court when it an-
nounced the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence (Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 
652, L.R.A. 1915B 834] ; see Segurola v. United States, 275 
U.S. 106, 111-112 [48 S.Ct. 77, 72 L.Ed. 186] ),. and it has 
been justified on the ground that it avoids the necessity of 
interrupting the trial to determine the collateral issue of the 
admissibility of the evidence. If the motion was denied, 
however, the trial court was required to consider de novo an 
objection to introduction of the evidence at the trial (Go1lled 
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312-313 [41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 
647] ; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 [41 S.Ct. 266, 
65 L.Ed. 654]), and since the defendant was thus afforded 
two opportunities to litigate the issue of whether the evidence 
was admissible, the objective of avoiding an unnecessary in-
terruption of the trial was largely defeated. Moreover, 
appellate review of the decision on the motion might be sought 
by either the prosecution or the defendant (see Essgee 00. 
v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 152 [43 S.Ot. 514, 67 L.Ed. 
917] ; United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 [51 A.L.R. 
416] ), even though defendant could raise the question again 
on appeal from the final judgment against him. In recent 
years, therefore, the federal courts have modified the require-
ments by allowing the trial court to entertain the motion 
for the first time at the trial (Fed. Rules Orim. Proc., rule 
41(e); Panzich v. United States, 285 F. 871, 872; United 
States v. Leiser, 16 F.R.D. 199, 200; United States v. Johnson, 
76 F.Supp. 538, 542; see United States v. Asendio, 171 F.2d 
122, 125), and by affording appellate review in most casest 
only on appeal from a final judgment of conviction. (Oogen 
v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 224 [49 8.0t. 118, 73 L.Ed. 
275] ; see United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 49 [72 S.Ot. 
93, 96 L.Ed. 59] ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 75, 80 
-For similar requirementS in state courts, see State v. Lock, 302 Mo. 
400, 429·432 [259 S.W. 116]; Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 632 [105 
N.E.2d 509]; People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 592 f53 N.E.2d 591]; ct. 
llic'kardB v. State, 6 Terl'1 (Del.) 573, 585 [77 A.2d 199]. 
tFor the instances in which the preliminal'1 motion still ia deemed a 
eeparate action and appealable aB such, see Cogen v. United States, 278 
U.S. 221,225-226 [49 S.Ot. 118, 73 L.Ed 275]; Matthew v. Correa, 135 
l!'.Icl6S4; Clwag W. v. Uaited Statu, US F.2d 915. 
) 
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[69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819] ; McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. <151, 453 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] ; United States 
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 [70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653]; 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 
436] ; Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893; Janney v. United 
States, 206 F.2d 601; Fracnkel, Recent Developments in the 
Fed~ral Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa L.R. 472, 488-
489; cf. United States v. Edmonds, 100 F.Supp. 862.) 
Ordinarily preliminary questions of fact that govern 
the admissibility of evidence are determined by the trial court 
when objection is made to the introduction of the evidence at 
the trial, and the experience of the federal courts indicates 
that there are no compelling reasons why an exception to 
the general rule should be made in the case of illegally ob-
tained evidence. (See Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 
152, 169-170 [224 S.W. 860]; Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn. 
682, 687 [257 S.W. 79]; see also 9 Wigmore on Evidence 
[3d ed.] § 2550; McCormick on Evidence §§ 52, 53.) The 
issues involved will ordinarily be no more time consuming 
or complicated than those presented to the trial court when 
it must rule, for example, on the admissibility of confessions, 
business records, or evidence claimed to be privileged, or on 
the qualifications of ex.pert or other witnesses. On the other 
hand, a requirement that a preliminary motion be made to 
suppress the evidence would inevitably result in delaying 
the criminal trial while the motion was being noticed, cal. 
endared, heard, argued, and determined. 
The judgment and order are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J. t and Schauer, J., eoncurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion rests entirely upon the exclusionary 
rule this day adopted by the majority in People v. Oahan, 
lmte, p. 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
The only material difference between the Cahan case and 
the present one is that in Cahan the illegality resulted from 
the absence of any warrant while in the present case a war-
rant was issued which was subsequently found to be techni-
cally defective. Here again the record contains abundant 
evidence to show the guilt of the defendant (see People v. 
Berger, (Cal.App.) 274 P.2d 514), and th( trial court 
properly admitted all of the challenged evidence in accord-
ance with the settled rule in this state prior to the decision 
in the Cahan case. 
I 
For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. O(lhan, 
ante, p. 434 [282 P.2d 905], I would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 25, 
1955. Shenk, J., and Spence, J.J were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted.. 
